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'~Good, Bad Deal": John F. Kennedy, 
W. Averell Harriman, and the 
Neutralization of Laos, 1961-1962 
EDMUND F. WEHRLE 
The author is a member of the adjunct faculty in the history 
department in the University of Maryland, College Park. 
Historians have devoted considerable attention to John 
F. Kennedy's Southeast Asian diplomacy. Yet the vast majority of 
these studies have focused narrowly on Vietnam when, in fact, it 
was Laos to which the president devoted the bulk of his atten-
tion during his first two years in office.1 In Laos, Kennedy faced 
a precarious situation, strikingly similar to the crisis soon to arise 
in Vietnam. Defying many of his advisers and risking political 
peril, Kennedy decided to pursue the formation of a neutral 
1. On Kennedy's priorities in office, see The Pentagon Papers: The Defense 
Department Histury of U.S. Decisionmakingon Vietnam (4 vols., Boston, 1972), 2: 161. 
Although the vast m,Yority of historians dealing with Southeast Asia in the 1960s 
have focused on Vietnam, during the late 1960s and 1970s several scholars began 
to piece together the story surrounding Kennedy's Laotian policy. These works in-
cluded Bernard B. Fall, Anatomy of a Crisis: The Laotian Crisis of 1960-1961 (Gar-
den City, N.Y., 1968); Hugh Toye, Laos: Buffer State or Battleground (New York, 
1968); Usha Mahajani, "President Kennedy and U.S. Policy in Laos, 1961-1963," 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 2 (1971), 87-99; Charles Stevenson, The End of 
Nowhere: American Policy toward Laos Since 1954 (Boston, 1972); Arthur Dommen, 
Conflict in Laos (New York, 1964); and David K. Hall, "The Laos Crisis," in Alexan-
der L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplo-
macy; Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Boston, 1971). More recent efforts include Arthur 
Dommen's general study, Laos: Keystone of Indochina (Boulder, Colo., 1985); Ter-
rence Ferner, "W. Averell Harriman and the Geneva Conference on Laos, 
1961-1962" (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1984); and Rudy Abram-
son, Spanning the Century: The Life of AvereU Harriman, 1891-1986 (New York, 
1992), 582-591. 
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government in Laos that would include both pr<rAmerican ele-
ments and representatives from the communist Pathet Lao. The 
president's efforts faced stiff opposition, sometimes from within 
his own administration. Yet Kennedy continued to resist escala-
tion and successfully obtained a negotiated settlement, even af-
ter a powerful communist offensive in May 1962. Although far 
from perfect, Kennedy's chosen course thwarted a communist 
takeover of Laos and provided relative stability for a troubled 
nation during dangerous times. 
In examining Kennedy's foreign policy, scholars generally 
have treated the young president as a hard-line Cold Warrior, 
wedded to anticommunism and confrontation.2 Those studying 
his Southeast Asian policies have echoed this assessment. Most 
historians have minimized his diplomatic accomplishments in 
Laos and insisted that the president simply intended to neu-
tralize the situation there so that he could concentrate on ag-
gressively thwarting communism in South Vietnam.3 However, 
2. For an historiographical discussion of Kennedy's foreign policy, see Bur-
ton I. Kaufman, ':John F. Kennedy as World Leader: A Perspective on the Litera-
ture," Diplomatic History, 17 (1993), 447-469. Kaufman characterizes the majority 
of scholars examining Kennedy as "still highly critical of the president." Among 
the general works disparaging Kennedy's foreign policies is Thomas G. Paterson, 
ed., Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963 (New York, 
1989). Robert Dean, "Masculinity as Ideology: John F. Kennedy and the Domes-
tic Politics of Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History, 22 (1998), 29-62, recently has 
driven the criticism of Kennedy in a new direction by offering a gender-focused 
study of Kennedy's diplomacy, which Dean argues was shaped by "cultural nar-
ratives of imperial manhood." Dean offers, however, little in the way of primary 
research. 
3. Among the more prominent studies arguing that Kennedy's accommoda-
tion in Laos paradoxically dictated a harder line in Vietnam are George MeT. 
Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York, 1986), 
128-129; Richard Reeves, President Kennedy, Profile of Power (New York, 1993), 116; 
Lloyd C. Gardner, Pay Any Price: Lyndon johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (Chicago, 
1995), 46; R. B. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War (2 vols., New York, 
1983), 1: 260; Roger Warner, Backfire: The CIA's Secret War in Laos and its Link to the 
War in Vietnam (New York, 1995), 84; and Lawrence Bassett and Stephen Pelz, 
"The Failed Search for Victory: Vietnam and the Politics of War," in Paterson, ed., 
Kennedy s Quest for Vzctory, 229-:-230. Other works, including John M. Newman,JFK 
and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power (New York, 1992), 9, 
269-274, Stephen E. Pe1z, "When Do I Have Time to Think? John F. Kennedy, and 
the Laotian Crisis of 1962," Diplomatic History, 3 (1979), 215-229, and Norman B. 
Hannah, The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War (Lanham, Md., 1986), 91, see 
few benefits that accrued from Kennedy's neutralization plan and argue that neu-
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while certainly a Cold Warrior, Kennedy exhibited his own 
brand of flexible, personal diplomacy in pursuit of his larger 
agenda. Mter an early attempt to address the Laotian crisis 
through counterinsurgency, he turned to diplomacy in April 
1961. He assigned toW. Averell Harriman the delicate job of 
forming a reliable neutral government through an interna-
tional conference at Geneva, Switzerland, but he continued to 
oversee the negotiations closely. Harriman's creative and often 
forceful diplomacy was the key to the successes achieved in 
Laos. Nevertheless, Kennedy remained in command; on at least 
two occasions, he overruled the calls of Harriman and other 
advisers to utilize American military forces in Laos to shore up 
diplomatic efforts. 
Operating against heavy odds, Harriman worked a series 
of near-miracles at Geneva. These included maintaining a 
cease-fire, eliciting Soviet support for Laotian neutrality, and 
persuading the American-supported, anticommunist royal gov-
ernment of Laos to cooperate. Under Harriman's guidance, 
and with Soviet support (apparently inspired by fears of Chi-
nese competition in Southeast Asia), Laos by mid-1962 had a 
functioning, neutral government, giving rise to hopes of ex-
panding the Laotian blueprint for neutrality to all of Southeast 
Asia. Members of Kennedy's own administration strongly advo-
cated such a policy, and the president was sympathetic. 
Yet, in the long run, the intricacies of the Southeast Asian 
political situation proved overwhelming, and the moment 
slipped away. The Laotian model was too complex and politi-
cally risky. Neither the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of 
China (PRC), nor the United States fully controlled its allies in 
the region, yet each insisted on retaining a fa<;ade of control. As 
a result, despite the positive spirit engendered at Geneva and 
the successful effort to neutralize Laos, Southeast Asia, by the 
end of the decade, had become the center of Cold War ten-
sions. Nevertheless, Kennedy's venture into the politics of ac-
trality allowed for further infiltration by the Viet Cong through the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail. William J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina (Stan-
ford, Calif., 1994), 305, however, credits Kennedy with achieving, in the words of 
Averell Harriman, "a good, bad deal in Laos." Further, Duiker sees Kennedy as 
"tortured by doubts about the wisdom of involvement" in Vietnam. 
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commodation was serious and, at least momentarily, successful.4 
*** 
In the decade before Kennedy's presidency, Laos was a 
pawn in the Cold War. The French agreed to end their colonial 
claim to Laos at the 1954 Geneva Conference; almost immedi-
ately, an intense struggle broke out between the Pathet Lao and 
the American-supported royal government. By the late 1950s, 
the Soviets had become involved, supporting the Pathet Lao. In 
an attempt to bring peace to his native land, Laotian Prince Sou-
vanna Phouma created a neutral government in 1957 with the 
aid of his half-brother, the "red" Prince Souphanouvong, leader 
of the Pathet Lao. But the United States under Dwight D. Eisen-
hower and John Foster Dulles regarded neutrality as nothing 
less than an accommodation with evil and rejected the coalition 
arrangement.5 This encouraged General Phoumi Nosavan, the 
right-wing leader of the royal army, to stage a coup, forcing the 
Pathet Lao and Souvanna into the hills, where they continued 
their guerrilla War with North Vietnamese, Chinese, and Soviet 
sponsorship. Souvanna made a brief return to head up another 
neutral government in 1960, but, again, General Phoumi, with 
American support, overthrew him. Souvanna retreated north-
ward to ally once more with the Pathet Lao.6 
4. The State Department's publication of relevant papers on the Laotian cri-
sis and the opening of material in the Averell Harriman Papers in 1987, as well as 
of related materials at the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential 
Libraries, allows for a closer look at Kennedy's Laotian policy. 
5. Most historians depict Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles as 
rigid opponents of neutralism. Both Stanley Wolpert, &ots of Confrontation in South 
Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and the Superpowers (New York, 1982), and Len E. 
Ackland, "No Place for Neutralism: The Eisenhower Administration and Laos," in 
Nina S. Adams and Alfred McCoy, eds., Laos: War and Revolution (New York, 1970), 
139-154, emphasize the Eisenhower administration's opposition to neutralism in 
Asia. H. W. Brands, The specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of 
the Third World, 1947-1960 (New York, 1989), argues that Eisenhower and Dulles, 
while publicly denouncing neutralism, acted more pragmatically in practice. In 
the case of Laos, however, Eisenhower always ardently opposed neutralism, in 
sharp contrast to Kennedy's policies. 
6. Harriman and others suspected that John N. Irwin, Assistant Secretary for 
International Security Affairs at the Pentagon under Eisenhower, organized 
Phoumi's overthrow of Souvanna Phouma. W. Averell Harriman, oral history in-
terview by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (Boston, 1964), 49, John F. Kennedy Library, 
Columbia Point, Mass.; J. Graham Parsons, oral history interview by Dennis 
O'Brien (Boston, 1968), 13, ibid. 
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By 1961, three main players, covering a broad political 
spectrum, had emerged on the Laotian scene: Phoumi on the 
far-right; Souvanna, the neutralist, slightly to the left of center; 
and, on the far left, Souphanouvong, the leader of the Pathet 
Lao.7 In addition, there were four outside players: the United 
States, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, and the People's Re-
public of China. Buoyed by an immense Soviet airlift of sup-
plies to northern Laos, the Pathet Lao were on the march early 
in 1961, winning a series of encounters that brought them to 
the verge of taking all of Laos. As President Eisenhower pre-
pared to step down from office, he grimly informed Kennedy 
that he must be prepared to intervene militarily in Laos. Eisen-
hower added that defeat in Laos would mean losing the "cork 
in the bottle." As such, the effect would be the "beginning of 
the loss of most of East Asia."8 
Kennedy had been elected on the basis of his promise 
to get the United States moving again, both domestically and 
internationally. Campaigning in 1960, he had attacked the 
Eisenhower administration's failure to challenge explicitly com-
7. The issue of Laotian "nationhood" deserves much deeper treatment than 
can be provided here. A landlocked country of roughly three million in the early 
1960s, with an impoverished, agrarian economy, Laos was a maze of religious, eth-
nic, political, regional, and family divisions. The Lao people make up roughly one 
half of the population, while several other ethnic groups, including the Hmong, 
constitute the rest of the population. Given the complex of vying interests in Laos 
and its colonial background, little in the way of any real "nationalist" sentiment 
existed. Thus, it is all the more remarkable that Souvanna Phouma managed to 
bridge some of the gulfs in Laotian society and establish a sense of legitimacy in 
the eyes of his countrymen. In regard to the Pathet Lao, see MacAlister Brown 
and Joseph Zasloff, Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Communist Movement in Laos, 
1930-1985 (Stanford, Calif., 1986), 70-86, for a general treatment of the Pathet 
Lao during the neutralization process. Brown and Zasloff depict the Pathet Lao 
as a "joint enterprise" with the North Vietnamese. 
8. "Memorandum for the Record," Jan. 19, 1961, in U.S. Dept. of State, Fur-
eig;n Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (24 vols., Washington, D.C., 
1988-1996), 24: 21; Fred I. Greenstein and Richard H. Immerman, "What Did 
Eisenhower Tell Kennedy about Indochina? The Politics of Misperception," Jour-
nal of American History, 79 (1992), 568-587. Some debate exists in regard to ex-
actly what Eisenhower told Kennedy at their meeting. Cabinet Minute, 128/35 
1(2), Jan. 17, 1961, Cabinet Records, Public Record Office, Kew, England (here-
after cited as CAB, PRO). Assessing the situation in Laos, Lord Home, the British 
Foreign Secretary, saw little hope of halting the Pathet Lao, short of "tactical nu-
clear weapons;' nor did the British see much hope of cooperation from the Sovi-
ets, especially in light of their "recent successes." 
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munist advances in the Third World.9 Key to the new presi-
dent's plan was the adoption of counterinsurgency to halt com-
munist advances.10 The new administration directed most of its 
counterinsurgency plans toward Vietnam, where military 
prospects looked brighter than in Laos. But the Inter-Agency 
Task Force on Laos, created by Kennedy in the opening days of 
his administration to deal with the Laotian crisis, clearly viewed 
military operations, including possible American intervention, 
as necessary in order to achieve U.S. goals in Laos.ll Kennedy's 
Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Mfairs, Walt Ros-
tow, strongly advocated a Laotian policy that would "orchestrate 
force and diplomacy intimately at every stage" and warned the 
president that "when we are being nice diplomats we tend to 
lose ground."12 
Yet on the diplomatic front, Kennedy saw positive signals 
emerging out of Laos in the early days of his presidency. Prince 
Souvanna wrote to Kennedy, suggesting some sort of compro-
mise. In spite of his alliance with the Pathet Lao, Souvanna was 
apparently not eager for a communist victory. Souvanna had an 
ally in Winthrop Brown, the American ambassador to Laos, 
who had long believed that only Souvanna could offer an al-
ternative to communist control. He seconded Souvanna's plea 
9. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, john E Kennedy in the White House 
(Boston, 1965), 72; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know (Oxford, Eng., 1997), 
183-184; Herbert Parmet,JFK: The Presidency of john E Kennedy (New York, 1983), 
8-9. 
10. Thomas G. Paterson, Meeting the Communist Threat: From Truman to Rea-
gan (New York, 1986), 207. My definition of counterinsurgency borrows from 
Paterson's discussion in which counterinsurgency is a general strategy, which "took 
several forms:' all aimed at applying aggressive force to counter communism in 
the Third World. William Bundy to the Secretary of Defense, Nov. 1961, box 1, 
Vietnam Documents, Joint Chiefs of Staff Central File, 1963, Records of the JFK 
Collection, Record Group 218, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter 
cited as RG 218, NA). In a recently declassified memorandum, Bundy outlined 
the administration's counterinsurgency program for Vietnam. Also see Duiker, 
U.S. Containment Policy, 249-308; Reeves, President Kennedy, 231-232; Brown and 
Zasloff, Apprentice Revolutionaries, 81. Mter 1960, the CIA sponsored a buildup of 
guerrilla troops in eastern Laos. Kennedy continued the effort as part of his gen-
eral counterinsurgency strategy. 
11. "Report Prepared by the Inter-Agency Task Force on Laos;' n.d., Foreign 
Relations, 1961-1963, 24: 62-71. 
12. "Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for Na-
tional Security Affairs to President Kennedy," March 10, 1961, ibid., 24: 83. 
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with a long telegram, urging that Kennedy seek a negotiated 
settlement involving Souvanna.13 On February 3, 1961, Ken-
nedy consulted Ambassador Brown personally at the White 
House. Brown recalled the meeting as "a very, very moving ex-
perience." Kennedy pressed the ambassador for his personal 
impressions of events-particularly whether Souvanna could be 
trusted. In response to one question, Brown began to explain 
official policy. Kennedy stopped him, saying "That's not what I 
asked you. I said, 'What do you think,' you, the Ambassador?" 
Brown opened up, treating the occasion like a "confessional." 
He criticized past American policy, finally telling the president 
that Phoumi was overrated and that only Souvanna could unite 
Laos.14 A few days later, the United States made the first tenta-
tive moves toward investigating a diplomatic solution by circu-
lating an initial proposal for Laotian neutrality to interested 
nations.15 
Kennedy, however, still appeared intent upon combining 
military methods with diplomatic efforts. In early March, with 
American encouragement, General Phoumi launched a last-
ditch effort to regain ground. Washington, according to Rostow, 
apparently saw the attack as a means to maximize "our bargain-
ing position:'16 The plan failed when the Pathet Lao soundly de-
feated Phoumi. The shock of the rout, combined with the 
disaster of the Bay of Pigs and the knowledge that he would 
soon have to face Nikita Khrushchev over the Berlin issue, left 
Kennedy shaken and open to less confrontational approaches.17 
The president moved sharply away from his initial reliance on 
military strategies toward a policy that emphasized diplomacy. 
Although many of his key advisers continued to advocate more 
13. Winthrop Brown telegram, Jan. 18, 1961, box 130, National Security 
Files, JFK Library. 
14. Winthrop Brown, oral history interview by Larry J. Hackman (Boston, 
1968), 14-15,JFKLibrary. 
15. "Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for Na-
tional Security Affairs to President Kennedy," Feb. 14, 1961, Foreign Relations, 
1961-1963, 24: 55. 
16. Walter Rostow, "Memoranda for the President: Evolution of Our Policy 
Toward Laos," March 9, 1961, box 130, National Security Files, JFK Library. 
17. Michael R Beschloss, The Crisis Ytiars: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963 
(NewYork, 1991), 132-134, 143-147; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 316; Theo-
dore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York, 1965), 630; Parmet,JFK, 176. 
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coercive efforts in Laos, the president adamantly avoided fur-
ther overt military actions. Clearly, the events of early 1961 had 
an impact on the young president. In April, he told former vice 
president Richard Nixon, "I don't see how we can make any 
move in Laos which is 5000 miles away if we don't make a move 
in Cuba which is 90 miles away."18 While never fully abandoning 
his interest in counterinsurgency, especially along the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail, Kennedy clearly had lost faith in the abilities of 
either the Laotian or American military forces to shape events 
in Laos. 
The failure of military efforts in Laos was not the only fac-
tor leading Kennedy toward negotiation. Prince Norodam Si-
hanouk of Cambodia conveniently suggested reconvening the 
1954 Geneva conference to deal with the Laotian crisis. British 
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan pressed Kennedy to pursue 
neutralization when the two met in late March.l9 Meanwhile, in 
spite of the vast Soviet investment in airlifting supplies to Laos, 
Khrushchev hinted to the American ambassador in Moscow, 
llewellyn Thompson, that he would not oppose a neutral Laos. 20 
On March 22, 1961, Harriman, who served the president 
as something of a roving ambassador, met with Souvanna in 
New Delhi. Over tea, Souvanna assured Harriman that neither 
he nor the majority of Laotians were communists. He proposed 
again to establish Laos as a neutral country with a coalition 
government, but this time with American support. Souvanna 
stressed that there was little time for such an arrangement and 
that the communist Pathet Lao would have to be represented 
in a coalition government.21 
18. As quoted in David Hall, "The Laos Crisis;' 70. 
19. Christian Chapman, oral history interview by C. S. Kennedy (Washing-
ton, D.C., 1990), 29, Georgetown University Foreign Affairs Oral History Program; 
Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 506-507. While the Eisenhower administration had 
regarded American sponsorship of neutrality as paramount to sin, Kennedy was 
open to the concept as a means of easing crisis points in the Cold War. In March 
the topic of Souvanna and a neutral Laos was discussed at a Key West meeting be-
tween Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Both came to the 
conclusion that a political solution was worth trying. Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 
184. Charles DeGaulle's declaration that France would refuse to support any west-
ern intervention in Laos could have encouraged Kennedy to pursue negotiations. 
20. Roger Hilsman, To Muue a Nation: The Politics and Foreig;n Policy of the Ad-
ministration of john F. Kennedy (New York, 1967), 130. 
21. Harriman to Dean Rusk, March 23, 1961, box 256, Averell Harriman 
Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
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Circumstances thus clearly favored negotiation rather than 
a military solution in Laos. Although he still had the alternative 
of committing U.S. troops to Laos-an option favored by many 
of his advisers-Kennedy now was reluctant to pursue a mili-
tary course. Politically, negotiations held some promise. 
Kennedy had inherited a deteriorating situation from Eisen-
hower. The previous administration, he could argue, had let 
the opportunity to challenge the Pathet Lao slip away. Through 
careful diplomacy, Kennedy could lure the significant neutral 
forces loyal to Souvanna away from their alliance with the Pa-
thet Lao and continue to pursue covert operations along the 
eastern border of Laos. This would represent an improvement 
over the conditions in Laos at the time of Kennedy's inaugura-
tion. A cease-fire leading to an international conference would 
also buy time. Should the Pathet Lao violate the cease-fire, 
Kennedy would then have international support for U.S. inter-
vention. Neutralizing Laos would allow Kennedy to concentrate 
on Western Europe and Berlin-his real priorities. 
Yet Kennedy's strategy brought with it political risk. At 
home, key congressional leaders of both parties warned the 
president against any capitulation to the communists. 22 Al-
though he urged the president to pursue negotiations, Prime 
Minister Macmillan recognized that Kennedy faced a difficult 
dilemma. In April he reported to a British cabinet meeting that 
Kennedy would be called "an appeaser" if Laos fell to the com-
munists, but if war resulted, Kennedy, like President Harry Tru-
man in Korea, would be a "warmonger."23 
Nevertheless, Kennedy pushed on with negotiations. He as-
signed Harriman to lead the American delegation to Geneva. 
The two men remained in close contact, with Kennedy often 
22. AFL-C/0 News, Feb. 11, 1961. A radio show sponsored by the AFL-CIO in 
February 1961 underscored the risk that Kennedy was taking in opting for neu-
trality in Laos. On the show, Democratic Representative Clement J. Zablocki, chair 
of the House Foreign Mfairs Subcommittee on the Far East, and his Republican 
counterpart on the committee, Representative Walter H. Judd, both urged 
Kennedy to stand up to the communists in Laos. Zablocki insisted that: "If we 
show one iota of weakness there [Laos] we are inviting trouble not only in Laos 
but the whole world." Washington Post, April 7, 1961. Congressional Republican 
leaders Senator Everett Dirksen and Representative Charles A. Halleck also 
warned Kennedy that a coalition government in Laos would inevitably result in a 
communist takeover. 
23. Cabinet Minute, 128/35 20(2), April13, 1961, CAB, PRO 
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phoning Harriman during the conference to reiterate his pref-
erence for a negotiated settlement. Kennedy also relied heavily 
on other ambassadors for firsthand observations and views on 
Laos not necessarily available from the centralized State De-
partment. Harriman later recalled that Kennedy essentially 
served as his own secretary of state. Winthrop Brown remem-
bered Kennedy as "in personal command of the situation" in 
Laos, reading, approving, and often writing many of the in-
structions sent to Harriman and others. Kennedy's unortho-
dox, informal style, often bypassing formal structure, amounted 
to a sort of personal diplomacy. 24 
In order to begin the conference, a cease-fire was neces-
sary. Both Harriman and General Lyman Lemnitzer, chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, urged Kennedy to use a small con-
tingent of American troops in Laos to enforce the cease-fire. 
Consistent with his policy throughout, however, Kennedy firmly 
resisted the introduction of American troops to shore up the 
truce.25 The opening of the conference had to be postponed 
several days, but a provisional cease-fire allowed it to begin on 
Mayl7, 1961. 
24. W. Averell Harriman, oral history interview by Larry Hackman (Boston, 
1970), 34-35, JFK Library; Harriman interview by Schlesinger, 73, 84. Mter ini-
tial reservations about the new president, Harriman became increasingly im-
pressed by Kennedy's "ability to penetrate to the heart of every problem and to 
sift through conflicting advice:' Brown oral history interview, 16; Parsons oral his-
tory interview, 31. Parsons also later remarked on Kennedy's unique style of diplo-
macy, referring to the "president's personal involvement, even to the point of 
picking up the telephone and calling officers of no great prominence for some-
thing that he wanted to know and know then." Senate Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Hearings on 
Covl!l'tAction, 94 Cong., 1 sess. (1975), 7: 137-138. Kennedy also sought to em-
power the local diplomats and ambassadors upon whom he relied for information 
and advice. The president issued a circular letter that put all American officials 
operating in foreign countries, including CIA agents, under strict control of local 
ambassadors. Most Kennedy intimates such as Roger Hilsman, Arthur Schlesinger, 
Jr., and Theodore Sorensen, concur with this view of Kennedy as an independent, 
resourceful, and pragmatic president charting his own course. However, the ma-
jority of historians have ignored evidence of Kennedy's bureaucratic indepen-
dence and have instead depicted Kennedy as a conventional Cold Warrior. In this 
regard, see Louise Fitzsimmons, The Kennedy Doctrine (New York, 1972); Richard 
Walton, Cold War and Countl!l' Revolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy (New 
York, 1972); and Paterson, ed., Kennedy's Qy,est for Victory. 
25. Harriman oral history interview by Schlesinger, 45-47. David Hall cred-
its Kennedy's diplomatic skills with bringing about the cease-fire in Laos. Hall, 
"The Laos Crisis." 
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The conference opened amid low expectations. In a mem-
orandum to President Kennedy, Harriman expressed little 
hope for the talks; he suggested that a walkout might be neces-
sary if things went poorly. An American contingency plan, in-
volving a "de facto division" of Laos, was prepared in case the 
conference failed. The plan proposed to leave the north to the 
Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese, while the south would re-
main a haven for the American-supported rightists. At the same 
time, Harriman made clear to Kennedy that such an arrange-
ment would require Americans to make "the ultimate deci-
sion": to use American troops to defend the south. Harriman 
was so pessimistic that he recommended that Laotian royal 
troops continue to train during the cease-fire "to support this 
eventuality."26 
As the conference opened, Harriman and Kennedy's pri-
mary concern was to gain concrete assurances of Soviet coop-
eration. Without a firm Soviet commitment to stop supplying 
the guerrillas and to persuade the North Vietnamese to halt 
their efforts, nothing could be accomplished. In spite of posi-
tive signals from the Kremlin, Soviet representatives at Geneva 
apparently had no official authorization to support neutraliza-
tion.27 In early June Kennedy and Khrushchev were to meet in 
Vienna. The meeting, Kennedy decided, would be the perfect 
occasion to press the Soviets for a definite commitment on the 
question of Laos. 
The Vienna summit proved to be an extraordinarily tense 
meeting. When Kennedy first brought up the topic of Laos, 
Khrushchev rebuffed him, saying that he was well aware of the 
part played by the United States in overthrowing Souvanna. In 
response, Kennedy admitted that American actions had not al-
ways been "wise," but then, sensing inflexibility, he shifted to 
other subjects. The next morning Kennedy again steered the 
conversation toward Laos and this time found Khrushchev in a 
more conciliatory mood. The Soviet chairman agreed to work 
26. "Memorandum for the President," May 1961, box 527, Harriman Papers; 
Cabinet Minute, 128/36 (4), June 29, 1961, CAB, PRO. According to the British, 
the United States was stationing heavy equipment in Thailand for use in Laos. 
27. Dommen, Loos, 194; Beschloss, The Crisis Year.s, 55, 84, 86-87. The Soviets 
had already sent some positive signals indicating a willingness to cooperate on 
neutrality. Yet, at Geneva, Soviet delegates avoided any commitment until after 
Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev's meeting at Vienna. 
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in good faith for the Geneva goals and observed that interested 
parties "should be locked in a room and told to find a solution:' 
The agreement on Laos was, in fact, the only positive note of 
the Vienna summit.28 
Thus, even as the Cold War appeared to intensify, the two 
superpowers were working together to resolve conflict in Laos. 
But why would the Soviets, after their massive airlift to support 
the Pathet Lao, agree to such cooperation? American and west-
ern delegates could only speculate on the matter. Some, such 
as Under-Secretary of State Chester Bowles, suspected that it 
was an early sign of a Sino-Soviet break, evidence that the Sovi-
ets feared a Southeast Asia controlled by China.29 Their expen-
sive airlift to the Pathet Lao was perhaps an effort to supplant 
Chinese influence. To the Soviets, the option of a strong neu-
tral government in Laos, and perhaps a series of other neutral 
governments across Southeast Asia, might be a welcome alter-
native to an enlarged Chinese sphere of influence. In retro-
spect, this analysis rings true, but it was hardly clear at the time. 
With the Chinese still very hostile-in fact, not speaking to the 
Americans-there was little hope that the United States could 
take advantage of a split even if one became more evident.30 A 
month after the Vienna conference, Harriman wrote to the 
American ambassador to Thailand, warning that Sino-Soviet 
tensions might actually make Khrushchev "more aggressive" 
toward the United States rather than open up new diplomatic 
opportunities. 31 
28. "Memorandum of Conversation," June 3, 1961, "Memorandum of Con-
versation," June 4, 1961, FareignRelaticns, 1961-1963,24:225-236. Beschloss, The 
Crisis !'ears, 211-212. 
29. Chester Bowles to Rusk, Oct. 5, 1961, box 526, Harriman Papers. 
30. Chester Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (New York, 1972), 
227-228. 
31. Harriman to Kenneth Young, July 8, 1961, box 528, Harriman Papers. 
Also see Department of State to Harriman, Oct. 3, 1961, box 526, ibid., for an ex-
tensive analysis of Soviet intentions toward Laos prepared by the British Foreign 
Service. The British study played down Chinese and Soviet differences, suggesting 
that some sort of a deal regarding Laos might have been struck between Hanoi, 
Peking, and Moscow. The British were mystified as to whether China or the Soviets 
controlled the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao. Finally, they speculated that 
Khrushchev was attempting to display his willingness to compromise in light of his 
hard stances on nuclear weapons and Berlin. The British judged neutrality as 
preferable in Khrushchev's mind to a partitioned Laos with the Americans firmly 
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The actual motives of the Soviet Union remained a puzzle, 
and the mystery grew deeper at Geneva. Soon after the Vienna 
summit, Russian delegate G. M. Pushkin went a step beyond 
Khrushchev's Vienna commitment to Kennedy. He pledged to 
be responsible for North Vietnamese and Chinese cooperation 
in maintaining Laotian neutrality. In return, he suggested that 
Great Britain should monitor American compliance with the 
agreements. In proposing this unusual arrangement, Pushkin 
apparently hinted at Soviet interest in easing tensions between 
North and South Vietnam.32 Pushkin's proposal, with the at-
tendant possibility of a Southeast Asian detente, excited some 
American officials, but Harriman was puzzled by the Soviet 
pledge: "It's very difficult for me to see what they would gain by 
taking a commitment which made them responsible for an act 
by their allies. It would seem to be more sensible to sit back and 
let the other fellow break the agreement and then pretend that 
they had nothing to do with it."33 
Whatever the Russian motives may have been, the Ameri-
can-Soviet exchanges at Vienna and Geneva significantly raised 
hopes for a successful negotiated settlement. A few days after 
the Vienna summit closed, Souvanna, his communist half-
brother Souphanouvong, and Prince Bon Oum, the head of 
the royal government, held a preliminary meeting in Geneva. 
This was a step forward, but the Americans continued to want 
a better sense of Souvanna, a figure still allied with the Laotian 
communists. 
Before the three princes met, Harriman arranged to have 
a comprehensive conference with Souvanna. The ambassador 
used the meeting to pepper the prince with questions. Pointing 
to his royal background and close ties to France, including his 
French wife, Souvanna assured Harriman that he was no com-
munist. The prince declared that he was ready to take the lead-
ership of Laos and asked for American assistance. Harriman 
hedged, saying that Souvanna was asking him "to believe too 
supporting the south with ground troops. For similar conclusions, see Earl H. 
Tilford, Jr., "Two Scorpions in a Cup: America and the Soviet Airlift to Laos," Aero-
space History, 27 (1980), 151-162. 
32. Harriman oral history interview by Schlesinger, 58; Frederick Nolting to 
Rusk, Sept. 20, 1961, box 528, Harriman Papers. 
33. Harriman oral interview by Schlesinger, 76. 
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much in one afternoon." In his report to Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk, Harriman conceded that Souvanna had responded 
properly to all his inquiries but added, "I left knowing little 
more about him than when I went in."34 At the three princes' 
meeting, Souvanna continued to act like a potential leader, ral-
lying the other princes to sign a general statement supporting 
the principle of neutralization. 
By mid-summer, Harriman had cautiously moved to the 
view that Washington could trust Souvanna and work with the 
Russians on the issue. Several weeks after his meeting with Sou-
vanna, Harriman cabled Rusk and announced, without enthu-
siasm, "that we are probably faced with necessity accepting 
Souvanna as Prime Minister [sic]." The alternative, Harriman 
explained, would be a return to hostilities, as well as the possi-
bility of American military intervention.35 
Even as the negotiations went forward, a group within the 
administration, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General 
Lemnitzer, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Rostow, 
and Rostow's assistant Robert H. Johnson, were drawing up just 
the sort of plans for military involvement that Harriman feared. 
These included unilateral American intervention.36 Although 
Kennedy clearly opposed any sort of American military involve-
ment and some in the military also warned against engagement 
in landlocked Laos, other prominent administration officials re-
mained committed to a military solution. 
If Phoumi learned of such plans, Harriman feared, he 
would have little incentive to participate in the negotiations. 
The ambassador therefore urged that the planning be discon-
tinued. 37 These caveats did not dissuade other advisers. At a 
meeting on July 28, 1961, Robert Johnson pressed Kennedy on 
contingency plans for Laos, suggesting that "it would be help-
ful in planning" for the president to approve of an intervention 
ahead of time, should one later become necessary. Kennedy 
shot back, complaining of previous overly optimistic military 
34. Harriman to Deari Rusk, June 11, 1961, Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, 24: 
243-244. 
35. Harriman to Rusk, July 31, 1961, box 538, Harriman Papers. 
36. See "Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara," July 
12, 1961, Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, 24: 292-294, for some of the details of the 
contingency plans. 
37. Robert H. Johnson toW. W. Rostow, n.d., ibid., 24: 413-414. 
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appraisals and making "it very plain that he himself [was] at the 
present very reluctant to make a decision to go into Laos." 
Kennedy urged that the Geneva negotiations be carried forth 
in good faith, adding that "nothing would be worse than an un-
successful intervention in this area."38 
In early September, a disturbing telegram from Brown sud-
denly diverted Harriman from the tasks at hand. The ambas-
sador had asked General Phoumi, the military leader of the 
royal forces, about rumors of Nationalist Chinese (Taiwanese) 
military units fighting the Pathet Lao in northern Laos. To 
Brown's shock, Phoumi confirmed that three companies of Na-
tionalist troops were indeed in Laos. The communist Chinese 
had long complained that Thai and Taiwanese troops were aid-
ing the royal government. The United States had always vigor-
ously denied the charges. Should the revelations about the 
troops from Taiwan become public, Harriman's accusations 
about North Vietnamese interference in Laos would appear 
hypocritical. In addition, the Nationalist Chinese might draw 
the People's Republic of China directly into the Laotian con-
flict. Harriman fired off an immediate response: "Urge in 
strongest terms that these units be disbanded and officers re-
turned, if possible, to Taiwan." Within two days the royal gov-
ernment agreed to withdraw the "irregulars;· defusing the 
potentially explosive situation. 39 
Harriman's next move came at a mid-September meeting 
with Souvanna in Rangoon, Burma, where he sought to spell 
out exactly what he expected of Souvanna. Over several meet-
ings, Souvanna reiterated his distrust of the communists and 
even went so far as to concede that it might be necessary to 
fight the Pathet Lao. Yet Souvanna remained too confident for 
Harriman's taste about the prospects for a neutral government. 
At the end of the meeting, despite his sense that the prince was 
"overly-optimistic" and "unrealistic" on several issues, Harriman 
38. "Memorandum of Conversation," July 28, 1961, ibid., 24: 322-326. 
39. Harriman to Rusk, Sept. 8, 1961, Department of State to Geneva, Sept. 
11, 1961, Brown to Rusk, Sept. 8, 1961, all in box 528, Harriman Papers; "Memo-
randum of Discussion on Laos," Feb. 8, 1961, box 130, National Security Files, JFK 
Library. While Harriman was shocked at the presence of the Kuomintang troops, 
Kennedy, Rusk, Rostow, and Alan Dulles had all been well aware of the Taiwanese 
troops since at least early February 1961. Chiang Kai-shek was apparendy opposed 
to the removal of the troops 
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was sufficiently satisfied to extend formal support to Souvanna 
as the leader of the coalition government.40 From there, Har-
riman moved to shore up international backing for Souvanna, 
lobbying Thai leader Marshall Sarit Thanarat and Prime Minis-
ter Jawaharlal Nehru of India for support. A strong relation-
ship with India was of particular importance because India 
headed up the three-nation control commission overseeing the 
Laotian cease-fire.41 
However, one important American ally, South Vietnam, 
went on record as opposed to Souvanna. On September 18, Am-
bassador Frederick Nolting sent an urgent telegram from 
Saigon to Harriman and Rusk, detailing President Ngo Dinh 
Diem's fears of a neutral government in neighboring Laos. Nei-
ther Diem nor Nolting trusted Souvanna. They maintained that 
a neutral government would be too weak to shut off North Viet-
namese access to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which ran through 
Laos and supplied insurgent communists in South Vietnam.42 
Instead, Diem advocated partitioning Laos. Nolting actually sug-
gested that, with Pushkin's cooperation, the Soviets might be 
willing to support a divided Laos, with the United States and the 
Soviet Union guaranteeing peace. But the unlikelihood of So-
viet cooperation in such a scheme and Kennedy's continuing in-
sistence that American troops not be used in Laos kept 
Harriman's negotiations on track.43 
While Kennedy backed Harriman's efforts, Nolting's ap-
proach had supporters in Washington. Harriman complained 
later that elements within the State Department refused to 
accept Souvanna and continued to believe that prowestern mil-
itary forces in Laos could be revived. At the beginning of Octo-
ber, Harriman cabled Rusk to say that, for the first time, he was 
feeling confident about his assignment. Still, he emphasized that 
success could be achieved only "if all agencies of the govern-
ment will continue to work for that goal."44 Harriman actually 
suspected that Kennedy's frequent phone calls, reiterating the 
40. Harriman to Rusk, Sept. 15, 16, 1961, box 528, Harriman Papers. 
41. "Memo for Alexis Johnson," June 19, 1962, box 527, ibid. 
42. Nolting to Rusk, Sept. 18, 1961, box 528, ibid. 
43. Adlai Stevenson to U.S. Delegation in Geneva, Sept. 22, 1961, Nolting to 
Rusk, Sept. 20, 1961, box 528, ibid. 
44. Harriman to Rusk, Oct. 1, 1961, box 528, ibid. 
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president's support for neutralization, were designed to "make 
sure I wasn't paying attention to the other opinions in the State 
Department:'45 Harriman's frustrations festered until he openly 
complained to a British delegate that high officials in the State 
Department were clinging to the policies of Dulles and refusing 
to recognize the "radical changes in policy which the new ad-
ministration had introduced." Rusk, Harriman lamented to the 
British, was blissfully unaware of the dissension, thus making 
work at Geneva all the more challenging.46 
Harriman never identified the source of resistance at the 
State Department. But Robert Amory, deputy director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under Kennedy, later pointed 
to the International Security Mfairs office of the State Depart-
ment and to Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff aide Victor Krulak, and Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense William Bundy. At the CIA, according to Amory, 
resistance centered around operations chief Richard Bissell and 
Director John McCone.47 
Many of those in the State and Defense departments who 
so troubled Harriman were close contacts of General Phoumi, 
the pro-American leader of the royal Laotian army. This com-
plicated Harriman's next challenge, that of getting Phoumi to 
45. Harriman oral history interview by Schlesinger, 57. 
46. [?]Carter to Foreign Office, 371/159948 (DF 2231/403), Sept. 9, 1961, 
Foreign Office Correspondence, Public Record Office, Kew, England (hereafter 
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ton-stationed members of the CIA and Defense Department resisted Kennedy's 
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Souvanna U.S. Ambassador Brown. William H. Sullivan oral history interview by 
Dennis O'Brien (Boston, 1970), 13. William Sullivan, Harriman's assistant at 
Geneva, commented that CIA Official Desmond Fitzgerald also showed great in-
terest in the Laos issue but did not fully trust Phounii and therefore did not ob-
struct Kennedy's efforts. Also see Brown oral history interview, 6, and Parsons oral 
history interview, 17. Cooper, The Lost Crusade, 234. Chester Cooper, an aide to 
Harriman at Geneva, has made similar allegations about resistance at the State 
and Defense departments to Harriman's mission. Some believed that opposition 
to the neutralization effort existed even within Harriman's own delegation at 
Geneva. The British Foreign Office suspected that the American delegate John 
Steeves was using his return to Washington during the conference's August re-
cess to undercut the neutrality initiative. Edward Peck to Malcolm MacDonald, 
371/159947 (DF 2231/381), Aug. 10, 1961, FOC, PRO. 
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participate in the neutral government. In September 1961 both 
Brown and John Kenneth Galbraith, ambassador to India, re-
ported that Phoumi had expressed discomfort with the idea of 
a government headed up by Souvanna. Galbraith worried that 
Phoumi would purposely break the cease-fire and retreat to the 
south, expecting American support.48 
In November 1961 fighting broke out near Xieng Khay, 
the Laotian communist stronghold. American officials feared 
that Galbraith's scenario was unfolding. Responsibility for 
breaking the cease-fire could not be pinned on either party; 
nevertheless, a cloud of suspicion hung over Phoumi and the 
United States. Harriman reported to the State Department that 
opinion at the conference had turned against the United States 
as a result of the violation of the cease-fire. The fighting at 
Xieng Khay stopped after a few days, but Harriman's suspicion 
of Phoumi's intentions remained.49 
Of course, Harriman was well aware of Phoumi's ability to 
subvert the Geneva negotiations. The general had a reputation 
as an ineffective military officer and a corrupt administrator of 
American aid. But Phoumi had supporters within both the 
American government and public. Columnist Joseph Alsop, for 
instance, considered the general a friend and a dependable ally 
for the United States. Alsop publicly praised Phoumi and de-
rided the Geneva conference as an "exercise in international 
hypocrisy." 5° Harriman, however, saw Phoumi as an obstacle re-
quiring immediate and forceful attention. 51 
In late January 1962 the key parties to the Laotian agree-
ment again prepared to meet in Geneva to arrange concrete 
plans for the composition of the coalition cabinet. Harriman 
feared that Phoumi would hold up the meeting by demanding 
the ministry of defense for himself, knowing full well that this 
would compromise the neutralization plan. 
To force Phoumi's cooperation, Harriman made an extra-
ordinary move. He decided to threaten Phoumi with a cutoff 
48. Brown to Rusk, Sept. 8, 1961, John Kenneth Galbraith to Rusk, Sept. 22, 
1961, box 528, Harriman Papers. 
49. Harriman to Rusk, Nov. 21, 1961, box 529, ibid. 
50. Washington Post, May 22, 1961. 
51. "Memoranda of Conversation, Harriman and Joseph Alsop," Feb. 15, 
1962, box 529, Harriman Papers. 
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of American aid and to ask the Soviets not to take advantage of 
the temporary weakness of the royal Laotian forces. On Janu-
ary 15, 1962, Harriman met with Pushkin and told his counter-
part that, if necessary, the Americans would "expect his 
assistance" in obtaining Pathet Lao assurances not to take ad-
vantage of the situation. Pushkin agreed. Harriman's admission 
of the complications of handling supposed allies was an un-
precedented event in the Cold War, where fa~ades of control 
often shrouded the struggles of both superpowers to keep re-
calcitrant allies under some degree of command. 52 
Even with the threat of no U.S. aid, Phoumi stood fast. 
The princes lingered in Geneva several days waiting for Phoumi 
to signal his willingness to resume negotiations. In a further ef-
fort to press Phoumi, an American, British, Canadian, and 
French task force met to consider "ostentatiously cultivating" a 
right-wing political rival of Phoumi in order to scare the gen-
eral into compliance. 53 The three princes finally met on Janu-
ary 19, 1962, but their conference went "nowhere." In a "black 
mood," Pushkin predicted the breakup of the entire confer-
ence and the renewal of hostilities.54 The following day, how-
ever, the princes, under pressure from all sides, surprised 
everyone and worked out a provisional accord. They endorsed 
all of the international agreements made at Geneva and de-
cided to put off the final decision of who would serve as de-
fense minister. Significantly, Phoumi did indicate a willingness 
to take another ministry post in place of defense. 55 
Superpower cooperation occurred infrequently in the 
Cold War, and both Pushkin and Harriman seemed to recog-
nize its rarity. Mter the breakthrough meeting among the 
princes, Harriman privately told Pushkin that he had grown to 
appreciate "the frankness with which we had come to speak 
52. Harriman to Rusk, Jan. 15, 1962, Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, 24: 
583-584. Also see Cabinet Minute, 128/36, 25(3), March 30, 1962, CAB, PRO. 
The British Foreign Service feared that cutting off Phoumi would mean the col-
lapse of the royal army and possibly lead to a Pathet Lao victory. 
53. United States Delegation to Rusk, Jan. 18, 1962, box 529, Harriman 
Papers. 
54. United States Delegation to Rusk, Jan. 19, 1962, box 529, ibid. 
55. ':Joint Communique of Princes Souvanna, Souphanouvong, and Bon 
Oum on the formation of the Lao Government of National Union," Jan. 20, 1962, 
box 529, ibid. 
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with each other" and added that this "was more than with any 
other Soviet in my experience." Pushkin returned the compli-
ment, saying that their cooperation was "an example of how 
the USSR and the US could work out immediate problems and 
conflicts in mutual interest."56 
In spite of their optimism, it soon became clear that Gen-
eral Phoumi was still not cooperating. Returning to Laos from 
Geneva, he let it be known that he intended to remain head of 
the military. Growing increasingly concerned, Harriman de-
cided to apply direct pressure. He arranged to suspend the $3 
million per month American grant to Phoumi and to have 
Laos-based CIA agent John Hasey sent home. Hasey was a close 
friend of Phoumi, and Harriman suspected that he was sub-
verting the peace efforts. Ambassador Brown, insisting that 
Hasey was loyal, disagreed with Harriman, but he supported 
Hasey's removal as another effort to pressure Phoumi.57 
Kennedy then sent Phoumi a personal message urging him to 
cooperate and making it clear that Harriman's words--and not 
those of anyone else-represented the president's views. 58 
Harriman also decided to go to Laos for a direct con-
frontation with Phoumi. To pressure the general, Harriman 
brought with him Phoumi's cousin, Marshal Sarit Thanarat, 
Thailand's dictator. Kennedy tapped Admiral Harry D. Felt, 
commander-in-chief of armed forces in the Pacific, to secure 
Sarit's help. In return for his support, Felt apparently promised 
Sarit some form of U.S. protection in the future. By the time 
that Harriman arrived in Southeast Asia in late March, the 
Thais had joined the Americans in issuing a joint communique 
in favor of Laotian neutrality. 59 
Upon arrival, Harriman ventured just over the Laotian 
border to the Thai town of Nong Khai. There Harriman met 
with Sarit, Phoumi, and Kenneth Young, the U.S. ambassador 
to Thailand. Phoumi began by insisting that Souvanna could 
not be trusted and repeating his reluctance to give up the de-
56. "Memorandum of Conversation between Harriman and Pushkin;' Jan. 
20, 1962, box 529, ibid. 
57. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 515; Brown oral history interview, 10-11, 
26-27. 
58. Department of State to Embassy in Laos, Jan. 27, 1962, Foreign Relation, 
1961-1963, 24:596. 
59. "Secret Draft Message for Admiral Felt," n.d., box 529, Harriman Papers. 
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fense and interior cabinet positions. The group began pressur-
ing Phoumi. Harriman explained that the cabinet positions 
were not negotiable. He accused Phoumi of being a "dictator 
to the rest of the world." Sarit assured his cousin that, if the 
coalition fell apart, there would still be time for the United 
States to intervene.60 
The next day, at a meeting with Phoumi and his deputies 
at Phoumi's Vientiane office, Harriman insisted that the Sovi-
ets would see to a North Vietnamese withdrawal. The Laotians 
were skeptical. One of Phoumi's supporters explained to Har-
riman, ''You have taken away the means of continuing our 
struggle. We have difficulty in following your somersaults in the 
cold war. We have great reservations regarding the Soviets. You 
have played your game. For us it is a matter of life and death[,] 
even existence." Disregarding the emotional plea, Harriman 
continued to view the royal forces led by Phoumi as "a defeated 
army."61 
By April it appeared that Harriman's coercive tactics had 
persuaded Phoumi to cooperate in the formation of a new gov-
ernment. But the American sanctions had allowed the North 
Vietnamese and Pathet Lao to regroup and plan an attack on 
the weakened Laotian army. During March and April commu-
nist guerrillas surrounded a royal army stronghold in the 
province of Nam Tha. On May 2, they attacked. Phoumi's 
troops reportedly ran from the oncoming communists. A cap-
tured diary from a North Vietnamese soldier fighting at Nam 
Tha revealed that the attack had been planned by the North 
Vietnamese leadership as a sort of Dienbienphu in Laos. In the 
space of several days, the communists almost drove Phoumi's 
troops out of Nam Tha.62. 
The Nam Tha attack raised questions not only about the 
intentions of Laotian and North Vietnamese communists but 
also those of the Soviets, who had promised to control the Pa-
thet Lao. The White House and State Department were frantic 
with fear that the attack might undermine a year of diplomatic 
work. In early May Harriman returned to Washington, where 
he and Under-Secretary of State George Ball received Soviet 
60. "Memoranda of Conversation," March 24, 1962, box 529, ibid. 
61. "Record of Meeting," March 25, 1962, box 529, ibid. 
62. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 140; Dommen, Laos, 73. 
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Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. Harriman and Ball reminded 
Dobrynin of the high-level American-Soviet cooperation on 
Laos, beginning with Khrushchev's personal word on the mat-
ter.63 Dobrynin blamed Phoumi's "clique" for the attack but re-
iterated Soviet support for Laotian neutrality.64 
Meanwhile, debate raged at the White House as to how to 
deal with the outbreak. Rostow wanted to bomb North Vietnam 
immediately. Others pressed for American military intervention 
on the ground, in effect bringing about the contingency plan 
to divide Laos.65 President Kennedy told Ball in strict confi-
dence that former President Eisenhower was threatening to 
make a public statement in favor of intervention.66 As he had 
at the beginning of the Geneva conference, Harriman advo-
cated sending American ground troops into Laos. Mter several 
days, Kennedy settled the debate. Again he decided not to in-
tervene directly in Laos. Instead, Kennedy sent the Seventh 
Fleet to Thai waters and dispatched 5,000 American troops to 
the Thailand-Laos border. Additional military support came 
from U.S. allies New Zealand and Australia.67 
Most American officials blamed the Soviets for the Nam 
Tha attack.68 While the State Department and the White House 
vented their anger, Llewellyn Thompson, the U.S. ambassador 
to Moscow, offered a sobering view in a cable to the secretary 
of state. Thompson reminded the State Department of its own 
problems reining in belligerent allies like Phoumi. The Soviets' 
63. "Paper prepared for 2:45 call by USSR Ambassador Dobrynin on the Act-
ing Secretary Mr. Ball," May 9, 1962, box 529, Harriman Papers. 
64. Anatoly Dobrynin to Harriman, May 15, 1962, box 529, ibid. 
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hold over their Laotian allies, the ambassador explained, was 
even more tenuous, with the communist Chinese standing by 
as an alternate means of support. Compared to the United 
States and its relationship with Phoumi, the Soviet Union had 
much less leverage. In the end, Thompson suspected, the Pa-
thet Lao and North Vietnamese had acted on their own.69 
The presence of American troops in Thailand and the 
continuing support for a neutral Laos by all principal parties 
brought a return to cease-fire conditions by the end of May. On 
June 11, 1962, Souvanna announced the final arrangements for 
the coalition government-with Souvanna as prime minister 
and Phoumi and Souphanouvong as vice premiers. With Lao-
tian neutrality on the verge of reality, the Geneva conference 
assembled for its final sessions at the beginning of July. The 
opening day mood was one of elation, almost a "class reunion" 
atmosphere. The delegates addressed the final details, and, on 
July 23, fourteen nations signed the final accords, requiring the 
withdrawal of all foreign troops from Laos within seventy-five 
days.70 
Optimism spread across Southeast Asia and Washington as 
the conference wrapped up successfully.71 In the aftermath of 
Geneva, encouraged by the ability of the United States to work 
with the Soviets in promoting neutrality for Laos, a group 
within the Kennedy administration began to press for an ex-
tension of the neutrality model to other Southeast Asian coun-
tries. Early on, Kennedy's interest in Laotian neutrality and the 
apparent Soviet cooperation in this venture encouraged a re-
thinking of American policy. In May 1961 Kenneth Young, U.S. 
ambassador to Thailand, wrote a memorandum suggesting that 
Laos might serve as "a catalyst changing the composition of our 
69. Llewellyn Thompson to Rusk, May 15, 1962, box 529, ibid. 
70. "U.S. Delegation in Geneva to Rusk," July 2, 1962, box 529, ibid. Along 
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Geneva accords created a "euphoria and optimism" that led McNamara to set in 
motion a planned withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. Pentagon Papers, 2: 
160-162. 
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policy."72 Christian Chapman, a desk officer at the American 
embassy in Vientiane, launched a proposal to create a neutral 
barrier of countries to the south of communist China. 73 
Higher officials at the State Department shared Chap-
man's views. In the fall of 1961, after Harriman had procured 
preliminary understandings with both Souvanna and the Sovi-
ets, Under-Secretary of State Bowles, prophetically warning that 
American military involvement in the area could result in a 
"humiliating defeat," issued a sweeping proposal. He called for 
the formation of an "independent belt" in Southeast Asia that 
would include Cambodia, South Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, 
Laos, and Malaya. 74 Encouraged by the successful completion 
of the Geneva conference, Bowles pressed his plan. He pro-
posed releasing a grand presidential "Peace Charter for South-
east Asia" that he personally would carry to Southeast Asia and 
launch. The Bowles proposal had supporters within the State 
Department, including Roger Hilsman, director of Intelligence 
and Research at the State Department, and his deputy Thomas 
Hughes. Hilsman later called the Bowles proposal "imaginative" 
and claimed that President Kennedy was sympathetic: "my 
sense of his attitude is that he accepted the concept as a farsee-
ing expression of the ultimate goal for Southeast Asia."75 
During the final days of the Geneva conference, Kennedy, 
through Harriman, appeared to be exploring the possibility of 
expanding the Geneva accords. On the day before the confer-
ence ended, Harriman and his aide, William H. Sullivan, met 
directly with Ung Van Kiem, the North Vietnamese foreign 
minister. In the official record of the meeting, Harriman noted 
an "improvement in candor" on the part of the North Viet-
namese, which included an admission of sorts that their troops 
72. Kenneth Young, "Our Framework for the Fourteen Nation Conference," 
n.d., box 527, Harriman Papers. 
73. Chapman oral history interview, 31. 
74. Bowles to Rusk, Oct. 5, 1961, box 526, Harriman Papers. 
75. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 43; Sorensen, Kennedy, 287. Sorensen notes 
that Kennedy "liked Bowles, liked most of his ideas." Sullivan oral history inter-
view, 34. Sullivan believed that "at heart he [Kennedy] was constantly looking for 
opportunities to see if we could expand from the Laos agreement, but at the same 
time feeling more confident about his military posture in Vietnam once Laos had 
been tied up." Parmet, JFK, 203-204. But Kennedy did demote Bowles in the 
"Thanksgiving Day massacre" in the fall of 1961, and the president obviously saw 
limits to Bowles's world view. 
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were operating in Laos. Political scientist Allan E. Goodman has 
suggested that Harriman also proposed the idea of neutraliz-
ing Vietnam along the lines of the just-completed Laotian 
model. The North Vietnamese, however, quickly insisted that, 
as a precondition for any negotiations, the United States must 
immediately Withdraw all support personnel from South Viet-
nam. This was unacceptable to the Americans, and the meeting 
ended with no progress. 76 
The following day, Harriman scheduled a formal talk with 
Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Li, in spite of some resistance 
from the State Department. At the meeting, Harriman hinted 
to Chen Li that the United States might be interested in easing 
tensions between the two nations, but the Chinese insisted that 
no movement could take place until the United States turned 
Taiwan over to the People's Republic of China. There the con-
versation ended. 77 
The North Vietnamese and Chinese reactions, it would ap-
pear, thwarted any further thoughts of neutralizing all of 
Southeast Asia. Upon Harriman's return to the United States, 
Secretary of State Rusk asked him to review Bowles's proposal. 
According to Bowles, Harriman had been an enthusiastic sup-
76. "Memorandum of Conversation," July 22, 1962, Foreign Relations, 1961-
1963, 24: 867-870. According to Allan Goodman, The Lost Peace: America's Search 
for a Negotiated Settl£ment of the Vietnam War (Stanford, Calif., 1978), 13-14, Kennedy 
authorized the top secret, July 22 meeting between Harriman and Foreign Minis-
ter Ung Van Kiem to explore the possibility that negotiations could be put in place 
to neutralize Vietnam along the Laotian model. William H. Sullivan, Obbligato, 
1939-1979: Notes on a Foreign Service Career (New York, 1984), 176-178. Sullivan 
also presents the meeting as designed to open an avenue to negotiations with the 
North Vietnamese. Sullivan to author, Feb. 29, 1996. Sullivan remembered "con-
siderable sensitivity about these talks" and deemed it "quite likely" that more was 
discussed at the meeting than is reflected in his official memoranda, although he 
did not recall the specific issues discussed. Sullivan often prepared separate mem-
oranda of meetings for the president only. Lawrence Bassett and Stephen Pelz 
have suggested-without evidence-that, after initial discussions regarding neu-
tralization, the North Vietnamese at some point dropped their demand for full 
withdrawal of American personnel. They insist, however, that Kennedy, after 
briefly flirting with negotiations, chose to turn instead to a more aggressive ap-
proach. Bassett and Pelz, "The Failed Search for Victory," 240. 
77. Harriman to John Czyzak, July 23, 1962, "Memorandum for Files: Per-
sonal and Secret," July 21, 1962, box 530, Harriman Papers; Harriman oral history 
interview by Schlesinger, 67-68; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 585. From his 
arrival in Geneva, Harriman had pressed the State Department to authorize him 
to conduct talks with Chen Li. 
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porter of his neutralization plan. 78 But in his response to Rusk, 
Harriman assailed the plan as unworkable and "impractical." 
The logistics of organizing conferences and procuring inter-
national and regional support would be nearly impossible. 
'More importantly, Harriman argued, the communists simply 
could not be trusted. 79 
The possibility of furthering the working relationship be-
tween the United States and Soviet Union established at 
Geneva also evaporated quickly. Pushkin died within a year of 
the Geneva agreement. When Harriman went to the Kremlin 
in 1963 to press Khrushchev to keep his side of the bargain on 
Laos, the Soviet premier virtually refused to talk about the is-
sue, perhaps out of embarrassment that the Soviet Union could 
not control the Pathet Lao. so 
Prospects for a Southeast Asian detente were thus short-
lived. The Soviet pretense of controlling the Pathet Lao and 
North Vietnamese quickly crumbled.81 In spite of Soviet guar-
antees and the Geneva agreement, North Vietnam continued 
to make free use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Aided by the North 
Vietnamese, the Pathet Lao resumed their guerrilla war after 
the Geneva agreements. The U.S. military continued to for-
mulate contingency plans involving American troops in case 
the coalition government failed. 
The agreements at Geneva should not be seen, however, as 
78. Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969 (New 
York, 1971), 409; George Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Viet-
nam, 1950-1975 (New York, 1985), 82. Herring links the Bowles proposals with 
Harriman's concerns about corruption in the Ngo Dinh Diem regime and the 
risks of military involvement. But after his experiences at Geneva, Harriman held 
little faith in the Bowles plan. 
79. Harriman to Rusk, July 30, 1962, box 565, Harriman Papers. 
80. Harriman oral history interview by Schlesinger, 59; "Memorandum of 
Conversation," April26, 1963, Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, 24: 1000-1005. 
81. Sullivan oral history interview, 16. The Geneva conference dented many 
long-held assumptions about the communist world. Sullivan later explained that 
the Americans began the negotiations believing that the Soviet Union dictated 
policy to both China and North Vietnam. "It wasn't until the end of the confer-
ence," Sullivan explained, "that we realized that the Soviets didn't have full con-
trol over the people on their side." 
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a failure. While Souvanna increasingly relied upon the United 
States, he still retained a certain legitimacy in the eyes of the 
Laotian populace.82 The addition of Souvanna and the sub-
stantial neutralist forces to the remnants of the royal army was 
enough to hold off the communists in key regions of Laos.83 
This provided the United States with a staging ground for its 
"secret war" against the North Vietnamese (clandestine cam-
paigns that were in clear violation of the Geneva agreements). 
Serving as ambassador to Laos beginning in 1964, Sullivan re-
called the CIA-trained Hmong warriors as having significant 
success as part of the "secret war" fighting the North Viet-
namese in northern regions of Laos. 84 Two years after the for-
mation of the coalition government in Laos, Harriman wrote 
with some satisfaction that the U.S. position in Laos _"is sub-
stantially better than it was two years ago. We have lost practi-
cally no territory .... We are now supporting the neutralists 
and the conservatives whereas before we were in the intolera-
ble position of supporting only the right wing." Harriman also 
credited neutralization with having "held the Mekong Valley 
from Viet-Cong control, and to a considerable extent pro-
tected Thailand from the subversive incursion that we were 
gravely concerned would make Thailand another guerrilla bat-
tlefield."85 Thus, while hardly an unqualified success, Ken-
nedy's pursuit of neutrality left the United States with a 
measure of influence in Laos and was certainly preferable to 
82. Memorandum, June 12, 1962, box 2, Roger Hilsman Papers, JFK Li-
brary; "Short Term Outlook for the Laotian Coalition Government," Sept. 26, 
1962, ibid. 
83. Newman,.JFK and Vietnam, 9, 269-274; Pelz, "When Do I Have Time to 
Think?" 215-229; Hannah, The Key to Failure, 91. Hannah, Newman, and Pelz have 
argued that Laotian ne~tralization allowed for even greater infiltration of South 
Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh Trail. While infiltration did pick up after the Geneva 
agreement, the prospect of a Laos controlled by the Pathet Lao would have set 
the stage, no doubt, for even greater infiltration. 
84. Sullivan, Obbligato, 210-213. See John Prados, The Hidden History of the 
Vietnam War (Chicago, 1995), 228-232, for general details of the Hmong "secret 
war" in Laos. 
85. Harriman to Bundy, July 11, 1964, declassified box 14cl, Harriman 
Papers. 
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either direct American intervention or a full Pathet Lao vic-
tory in Laos. 
By the end of his life, Kennedy was moving away from any 
idea of expanding neutrality to all of Southeast Asia.86 None-
theless, his dogged pursuit of a coalition government in Laos 
provides valuable insights into the nature of Kennedy's diplo-
matic style, especially in relation to the question of Vietnam. 
Some have suggested that Kennedy was interested in paci-
fYing Laos mainly so that he could focus all his attention on wag-
ing an active war against communism in Vietnam.87 Kennedy's 
experience in Laos, however, taught him the value of risk and 
compromise. Kennedy initiated negotiations, pressed Khrush-
chev for support at Vienna, and stuck to negotiations, over even 
Harriman's reservations. Kennedy refused to use American 
troops in Laos and in doing so defied virtually all of his advisers. 
In his support for Souvanna, Kennedy showed an understand-
ing of the importance of finding leaders with popular legiti-
macy. Kennedy also showed a willingness to seek information 
and conduct policy in an unorthodox manner by contacting 
and dealing directly with ambassadors such as Harriman and 
Brown, and by circumventing the State Department, where en-
trenched interests, such as those at the International Security M-
fairs office, threatened to thwart his intentions. Finally, Kennedy 
was prepared to use neutrality as a diplomatic and political tool 
to the end of providing delays, realignments, face-saving devices, 
and fac;;ades for other efforts. At the very least, Kennedy learned 
that he could ease political pressure through creative diplomacy. 
Whatever path Kennedy would have chosen for Southeast Asian 
policy after 1963 will forever remain a mystery. One can only 
surmise that future decisions would have been shaped by the in-
86. "Memorandum of Conversation," Sept. 23, 1963, Foreign Relations, 
1961-1963, 24: 1053. In a meeting with Souvannain the fall of 1963, Kennedy told 
the Laotian prime minister that, while he was open to neutralizing Vietnam, the 
"necessary ingredients seemed to be lacking," such as a figure like Souvanna who 
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87. Sullivan oral history interview, 34. 
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tensely independent and personal style of diplomacy that 
Kennedy had practiced throughout the Laotian crisis. 88 
88. Herring, America's Longest War, 82-101. Roger Hilsman and Kennedy aide 
Kenneth O'Donnell both claimed that Kennedy told them that he had no inten-
tion of using American forces in Vietnam. Harriman oral history interview by 
Hackman, 35-37. Harriman commented that, before Kennedy died, he "was al-
ready concerned that we were becoming too deeply involved in Vietnam." 
Harriman further asserted that those in the administration who shared Kennedy's 
concerns about Vietnam, were "pushed aside" by the Lyndon Johnson admin-
istration. "Memorandum for the President, Subject: Report of the McNamara-
Taylor Mission to SVN," Feb. 10, 1963, Vietnam Documents, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Central File, 1963, RG 218, NA; "Summary Report on Eighth Secretary of Defense 
Conference, Honolulu, May 7, 1963," box 1, ibid. Materials declassified by the 
Assassination Records Review Board in the fall of 1997 confirm that the Kennedy 
administration was seriously considering a withdrawal of roughly 1,000 advisers 
from Vietnam in 1963. In spite of the finesse and skill with which Kennedy han-
dled the Laotian crisis, most historians have continued to consider him a conven-
tional Cold Warrior, especially in regard to Vietnam. Scholars Gardner, Smith, and 
Kahin have all argued for an essential consistency between the Kennedy and John-
son policies on Vietnam. With little historical evidence to support his contentions, 
Noam Chomsky, Rethinking Camelot:.JFK, the Vietnam War, and the U.S. Political Cul-
ture (Boston, 1993), has insisted that Kennedy was rabidly eager to go to war in 
Vietnam. As new sources become available, new research, unencumbered by pre-
conceived notions, is needed to portray the nature of Kennedy's diplomacy more 
fully. 
